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Schedule A Cases: Fact vs. Fiction

Fiction 1: Issues in Schedule A Cases Have Not Received Appellate Review

Fact: Cases filed against multiple trademark counterfeiters operating e-commerce stores outside of the U.S., now called Schedule A cases, have been filed since at least 2010. Since then, thousands of cases have been filed. The issues have been fully litigated with adversarial presentation, including multiple appeals. This includes the Seventh Circuit[1] and Second Circuit[2] affirming findings of personal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit[3] affirming that there was “no basis to find misjoinder” and upholding email service, and the Seventh Circuit[4] twice finding that a district court abused its discretion by refusing to award profits. The Seventh Circuit has also confirmed that defendants in Schedule A cases that register their stores under a business name must be represented by counsel.[5] In addition, the Federal Circuit has addressed the standard for establishing design patent infringement.[6]

Circuit courts have addressed multiple other issues relevant to Schedule A cases, including the following: authorizing alternative service on off-shore e-commerce sellers, including in China, via e-mail under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3);[7] finding that it is proper to proceed against “John Doe” defendants[8] or naming defendants by a “code name[9]”; and that pleading against defendants engaged in the same conduct collectively is proper.[10]

Circuit courts have also affirmed that ex parte TROs with asset restraints are properly entered against off-shore counterfeiters likely to dissipate assets.[11] Proceeding with an ex parte TRO is appropriate, particularly in counterfeiting cases, when providing notice would “render fruitless further prosecution of the action.”[12] A plaintiff can also rely on experience with similarly situated defendants to establish that proceeding ex parte is appropriate.[13]

Fiction 2: U.S. Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Foreign E-Commerce Sellers

Fact: Defendants in Schedule A cases, through their own voluntary choices, create the necessary minimum contacts that subject them to jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Defendants create the necessary contacts required for personal jurisdiction by creating U.S.-facing e-commerce stores, which requires them to take multiple affirmative steps to select the forum(s) in which they choose to do business, and then subsequently accepting orders from consumers within the forum.[14] This demonstrates that defendants structure their business to target a forum and foresee doing business with consumers in that forum. Defendants are usually also subject to personal jurisdiction in any U.S. district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) since they target the Unites States.[15]

Fiction 3: Electronic Service of Process under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) is Improper

Fact: Service of process in Schedule A cases is typically completed by electronic publication of documents on a website, and then sending the defendants an e-mail that contains a link to that website and copies of the documents. This operates similarly to service through ECF. The “overwhelming majority” of courts have held that electronic service of process on foreign defendants is permissible under Rule 4(f)(3), including on sellers in China.[16] The three subsections of Rule 4(f) are not hierarchical, and provide equally valid means of serving an international defendant.[17]

To be valid under Rule 4(f)(3), the court directed method of service must be: (1) reasonably calculated to provide defendants with notice of the case and afford them with an opportunity to defend; and (2) not prohibited by an international agreement.[18] No other requirements exist. It is well-established that electronic service for online sellers, including e-mail, comports with due process[19] and the vast majority of courts have reached the “more straightforward conclusion” that the Hague Convention does not prohibit electronic service of process. [20]

In Smart Study Co. v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi,[21] a circuit court found that the district court’s decision to dismiss certain China-based defendants for improper service did not constitute an abuse of discretion.[22] Smart Study conflicts with the majority view of other circuit courts that have held that service through the Hague Convention is not mandatory and that electronic service is proper under Rule 4(f)(3).[23] Smart Study erroneously determined e-mail service is prohibited by the Hague Convention by asking whether e-mail service is explicitly provided for in the Hague Convention, instead of “whether the alternative service method in question is ‘prohibited’ by the agreement.”[24] Given that Rule 4(f)(1) already authorizes parties to complete service by using the methods provided for in the Hague Convention[25], the decision renders Rule 4(f)(3) superfluous.[26]

Rule 4(f)(3) also authorizes courts to order special forms of service not mentioned in the Hague Convention[27], when, for example, there is a need for speed that cannot be met by following the Hague Convention’s methods.[28] This includes “[c]ases where the proceedings have been begun with an injunction application, which is to be served immediately or in short order on the respondent[.]”[29] Since Smart Study is only precedent in the Second Circuit, other district courts are not required to follow this outlier decision.

Fiction 4: Defendants Are Typically Unrepresented, Do Not Receive Due Process and Default

Fact: Only the defendant list and store screenshots are sealed for up to 14 days while the TRO is effectuated. Defendants then receive prompt and repeated notices via email from plaintiffs and the platforms, and the documents are unsealed. TROs in Schedule A cases accomplish two things: they remove the infringing product listings from the online marketplace platforms, and they temporarily restrain the funds in the sellers’ online marketplace accounts. The sellers’ online stores remain operational, and asset restraints do not capture all of the defendants’ assets (since the funds are regularly disbursed to their linked foreign bank accounts, usually every two weeks). Defendants can also seek to modify the asset restraint by simply providing sales records showing that the frozen funds are not the proceeds of infringing sales.

Defendants, the overwhelming majority of which are represented by counsel, choose to settle because there is typically no dispute on liability, and defendants risk having to pay a much higher damages award in litigation.[30] Although many sellers claim to be small and ignorant,[31] the reality is that nearly all are sophisticated, China based sellers that choose to participate in cross border ecommerce with consumers in the United States. In situations where defendants do default, it is typically because no funds were frozen and it is more economical to set up a new store.[32] There are also dozens of websites that provide sellers with tactics to avoid detection, tips to determine whether a seller is being investigated by a rights owner, and what to do if they are being sued in a Schedule A case.[33]

Fiction 5: Plaintiffs have Access to All of Defendant’s Sales Data Through Platforms

Fact: The TROs and third-party discovery orders issued in Schedule A cases direct online marketplaces to produce defendants’ sales records. In actuality, the information and documents that online marketplaces produce vary by platform and are extremely limited. In most cases, the provided sales information is only for a single infringing product identified by a unique product ID number. Platforms do not provide sales information for the same infringing product identified by other product ID numbers or for variations of the product in other colors or sizes. Nor do platforms perform a search to determine if other infringing products were sold by the defendant in the past or currently. Non-party platforms object to producing complete sales information because defendants have access to the information and can produce it themselves. Defendants exploit plaintiffs’ lack of access to sales data by either refusing to provide sales records or providing incomplete and misleading sales records to the plaintiffs and the court.

Fiction 6: Schedule A Complaint Templates Do Not Comply with Pleading Standards

Fact: The use of templates is common practice across the legal industry and recommended by the American Bar Association for efficient representation.[34] Schedule A cases are straightforward trademark infringement and/or copyright infringement claims[35] that comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s general notice-pleading requirements.[36] “Defendant-specific” or “particularized[37]” allegations are not the standard, nor are they required since each allegation is made against every defendant on Schedule A.[38]

A typical complaint includes allegations about the rights owner, its intellectual property rights and products, and how genuine products are sold, and informs defendants that the products they listed on their e-commerce stores infringed that intellectual property. The defendants’ e-commerce stores are identified on Schedule A to the complaint, and the screenshot evidence (which includes additional information) is attached as an exhibit to the complaint.[39] This gives defendants notice of what claims are asserted against them and permits them the opportunity to defend.[40] Defendants in Schedule A cases all fit the same specific fact pattern, and there are only so many ways to phrase the allegations against them. “Far from advancing the interests of clarity and precision” making “repetitious allegations would compound the confusion of courts and parties and frustrate the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases.”[41]

Fiction 7: Screenshot Evidence Is Insufficient to Evaluate the Merits

Fact: The evidence submitted in Schedule A cases is sufficient for Courts to accurately and efficiently evaluate the merits of the claims, whether ex parte[42] or with adversarial presentation. Schedule A cases are only meant to address straightforward and obvious infringement. Properly brought Schedule A cases should not include cases that need additional context to determine infringement.[43] The evidence includes annotated screenshots of the defendants’ infringing products, and a rights owner’s declaration confirming that the use of IP was unauthorized.[44] The evidence itself includes additional information and context about a defendant and its product. The pleadings and motion papers provide sufficient information about the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s IP and products, and how Plaintiff uses its IP. The relevant facts about the defendants and their sales operations are also identical in each case.

Given these circumstances, a detailed product-by-product written description of infringement is inefficient and unnecessary because the infringement determination will come down to conducting a visual comparison in virtually every case. For example, in copyright infringement cases, the visual comparison will generally establish both substantial similarity and access to the copyrighted work.[45] Likewise, in trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases, the visual comparison shows the defendants used an identical or substantially indistinguishable mark on or in connection with the infringing product which will establish a likelihood of confusion.[46] District Courts that see a larger volume of Schedule A cases are well educated on the underlying issues and relevant laws, and can efficiently evaluate the merits.

Fiction 8: Stores Must Be Commonly Owned to Be Joined in the Same Case

Fact: Joinder is a procedural “device centrally concerned with the economies of aggregating small claims” meant to “enable economies in litigation”[47]; it has no effect on substantive rights.[48] Rule 20, which governs joinder, should be “construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”[49] There is no text in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or relevant statutes that requires e-commerce stores be commonly owned or related to be joined in the same case.[50]

Since Congress intentionally did not define what constitutes “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,”[51] whether to join defendants is left to the discretion of the court based on the policy rationales of joinder.[52] Most courts have concluded that Rule 20’s inclusion of the terms “series”[53] and “occurrences” gives courts discretion to join anonymous online sellers engaging in similar surreptitious conduct in a single action.[54] Courts have concluded that “[d]iscretionary joinder [is] the best path forward” because it permits rights owners to obtain meaningful relief, minimizes the burden on the courts, and does not prejudice defendants.[55]

Some courts and academics cite a need for payment of filing fees as justification to deny joinder.[56] Courts are funded by taxpayer dollars through congressional appropriations that account for 0.1% to 0.2% of federal spending, not filing fees. “Circumvention” of filing fees is not a valid consideration for whether joinder is proper,[57] and is a “weak” or “self-interested”[58] justification.

When Congress has wanted to limit joinder of defendants under Rule 20, it has expressly enacted requirements for where those limitations apply.[59] Some courts have interjected new requirements into Rule 20. For example, in Toyota v. The P’ships, et al.,[60] the Court required the plaintiff to establish a “hub-and-spoke conspiracy” with a “rim” connecting the defendants or to show that defendants have a “shared purpose” that they work together to achieve. The text of Rule 20 does not include any such requirements,[61] and Congress has not otherwise limited Rule 20 for Schedule A cases. Judicially imposed limitations are also often based on speculative or hypothetical concerns that are not in the record and, therefore, should not be considered.[62]

Fiction 9: Cases Are Only Filed in NDIL Due to Forum Shopping

Fact: Schedule A cases are filed across the country[63] in at least Illinois, New York, Florida, Texas, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey, Georgia, Colorado, Tennessee, Hawaii, and Virgina. The cases are filed by law firms ranging from sole practitioners to Am Law 100 firms. Circuit case law also plays an important role when choosing a forum. Many Schedule A cases have been filed in NDIL because a few Chicago-based firms have been filing Schedule A cases there for famous brands for over a decade. Since brand protection litigation against foreign e-commerce stores is a niche practice, rights owners used the same attorneys. The more recent increase in Schedule A cases filed in NDIL is likely due to several factors. First, unlike most district courts, NDIL does not require attorneys to be licensed in the State of Illinois or to obtain local counsel with an office in the district. Additionally, many judges in the NDIL no longer conduct in-person hearings, making it easier for out-of-state attorneys to practice remotely in the district. The increase in filings is also a result of new judicial resistance to joinder, which has multiplied the number of cases filed by nearly three-fold.

Fiction 10: Third Parties Cannot Be Enjoined

Fact: Schedule A cases generally require third parties to take affirmative steps, including freezing defendants’ funds and taking down the infringing listings. A court’s authority to issue these injunctions comes from the All Writs Act,[64] which codifies the court’s inherent authority to issue injunctions necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent frustration of its orders.[65] The Act authorizes courts to issue writs as “to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice[,] and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice.”[66] Without requiring third parties to take affirmative steps, the defendants will simply disregard and frustrate the Court’s injunction. Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 permits Courts to issue injunctions directed at defendants’ agents.[67] Courts have found that the third parties act as agents for defendants and can be bound under Rule 65.[68]

Fiction 11: Asset Restraints Are Improper

Fact: What distinguishes Schedule A cases from unsuccessful enforcement mechanisms is that Schedule A cases provide legitimate deterrence in the form of damages recovery. Under the Lanham Act and Copyright Act, a plaintiff is afforded, as an equitable remedy, the right to recover the defendants’ illegal profits[69] that were gained through the defendants’ sale and distribution of infringing products. A Court “unquestionably has authority to freeze assets to preserve an equitable accounting of profits….”[70]

Defendants in Schedule A cases, as opposed to defendants in conventional infringement cases, recognize that they do not face any real risk of consequences and that it will be virtually impossible to enforce any U.S.-based judgment entered against them.[71] These defendants “take advantage of a set of circumstances—the anonymity and mass reach afforded by the internet and the cover afforded by international borders—to violate [Plaintiff’s] trademarks with impunity.”[72] Given these unique circumstances, and the inherently deceptive nature of the defendants’ conduct,[73] the vast majority of courts agree that the defendants are likely to hide or dissipate their assets once they receive notice of the lawsuit.[74] To preserve a plaintiff’s ability to pursue an accounting of profits, most courts agree that it is necessary and appropriate to issue ex parte pre-judgment asset restraints.[75] Circuit courts have affirmed that ex parte TROs with asset restraints are properly entered against off-shore counterfeiters likely to dissipate assets. As the Second Circuit explained, proceeding with an ex parte TRO is appropriate, particularly in counterfeiting cases, when providing notice would “render fruitless further prosecution of the action.”[76] A plaintiff can also rely on experience with similarly situated defendants to establish that proceeding ex parte is appropriate.[77]

In Zorro Prods., Inc. v. Individuals, the Court found that a pre-judgment asset restraint was not warranted because, based on other cases with other parties, it believed that the plaintiff’s accounting of profits request was illusory.[78] However, Zorro does not address a Seventh Circuit decision finding that a pre-judgment asset restraint is appropriate when a plaintiff is seeking an accounting of profits even when plaintiff is also seeking, in the alternative, statutory damages.[79] Moreover, there was “no basis, on [the] record, to conclude that plaintiffs are not seeking what they ask for” with respect to an accounting of profits.[80]

Fiction 12: Papers Criticizing Schedule A Cases are Based on Comprehensive Experience in Online Brand Protection, Studies and Research

Fact: Even though Schedule A lawsuits have been filed for fifteen years and are legally and procedurally sound (see above), a new trend for a few academics is to write papers criticizing them.[81] The papers are not based on any extensive experience in online brand protection, litigating Schedule A cases or comprehensive studies. Instead, the papers present a single negative viewpoint based on speculation and unsupported assumptions. The papers also cite only a handful of outlier cases while intentionally omitting and/or ignoring the cases cites above. It is also clear that the authors have a fundamental misunderstanding about the effectiveness and cost realities of other available online enforcement mechanisms. Papers about Schedule A cases, especially academic papers, can and should provide a balanced viewpoint and necessary context.[82] The authors of a recent paper have done just that.[83]

  1. NBA Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 627 (7th Cir. 2022). ↑

  2. Am. Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271, 280 (2d Cir. 2024). ↑

  3. Viahart, L.L.C. v. GangPeng, 2022 WL 445161, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022). ↑

  4. Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store, 132 F.4th 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2025); Dolls Kill, Inc. v. MengEryt, No. 24-2841, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28582, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) ↑

  5. Cosrx Inc. v. FDPR Home Harmony, No. 25-3038, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2656, at *1-2 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026). This decision will also help counter the growing trend of AI-generated pro se filings that are clogging up district court dockets in Schedule A cases. ↑

  6. ABC Corp. I v. P’ship & Unincorporated Ass’ns. Identified on Schedule “A”, 52 F.4th 934, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2022); ABC Corp. I v. P’ship & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20651, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 2025). ↑

  7. See, e.g., Nagravision SA v. Gotech Int’l Tech. Ltd., 882 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2018); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2002); Viahart, 2022 WL 445161, at *3. ↑

  8. See, e.g., World Wrestling Ent., Inc. v. Unidentified Parties, 770 F.3d 1143, 1144-46 (5th Cir. 2014); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1980). ↑

  9. Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Suing a code name is in principle no different from suing any other name, which must be linked to a particular person by the time of judgment. In principle a person could be sued by Social Security number, passport number, or any other identifier. For some purposes the code is better; the world has a lot of people named ‘John Smith’ (and even some named ‘John Q. Public’), while a unique identifier is specific.”). ↑

  10. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir. 2009). ↑

  11. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2014); Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc., 256 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2007); Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d at 561 (9th Cir. 1992). The Gucci Am. Court also rejected the argument that the asset restraint “exceeded the court’s equitable authority because it failed to identify the ‘particular property’ derived from the defendants’ allegedly unlawful activities that the plaintiffs seek to recover” and that the plaintiffs’ request for an accounting was illusory. Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 133; see also CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Redisi, 309 F.3d 988, 996 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming, asset freeze proper for the pendency of a case where plaintiff seeks an accounting of profits and in the alternative, statutory damages). ↑

  12. Matter of Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 325 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The requirements of Rule 65(b) need not be burdensome when there is truly a need to proceed ex parte.”). ↑

  13. See, e.g., Matter of Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d at 2, 5; First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 651 (6th Cir. 1993); Reno Air Racing Ass’n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). ↑

  14. See, e.g., Zembrka, 118 F.4th at 277-78; NBA Props., 46 F.4th at 624-25; Manchester United Football Club Ltd. v. P’ships, et al., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231758, at *9-12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2024); Pit Viper, LLC v. Xi’An Jiaye Tengda Trading Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222165, at *6-11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2024). ↑

  15. See, e.g., ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais, LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2001); Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. Polygroup MacAu Ltd., 140 F.4th 1304, 1315-25 (11th Cir. 2025); Nagravision, 882 F.3d at 489-99; United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 1999). District Courts also have an independent obligation to consider whether to transfer a case if jurisdiction is lacking. North v. Ubiquity, Inc., 72 F.4th 221, 228 (7th Cir. 2023). ↑

  16. See, e.g., Peanuts Worldwide LLC v. P’ships, et al., 347 F.R.D. 316, 330 (N.D. Ill. 2024); NBA Properties, Inc. v. P’ships, et al., 549 F. Supp. 3d 790, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2021); Strabala v. Zhang, 318 F.R.D. 81, 114-15 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Individuals, et al., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216016, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2025); Chen v. P’ships, et al., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3672, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2025); Oakley, Inc. v. Yantai Lanlei Network Tech. Co., Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 273527, at *3, *4 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2021); Neman Bros. & Assocs. v. P’ships, et al., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223383, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2024); Order, Skechers U.S.A., Inc. II, v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-07333 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2025) (No. 120).. ↑

  17. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); see also NBA Props, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 796; Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Tech. Co. v. P’ships, et al., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64064, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2021) (“the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not require Plaintiffs to attempt Hague Convention service prior to seeking alternative service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3)”).. ↑

  18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015. ↑

  19. See, e.g., Peanuts Worldwide, 347 F.R.D. at 324-25. ↑

  20. Id. at 324-31. ↑

  21. No. 24-313, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33039 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2025). ↑

  22. Id. at *11, 20 (“we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying relief here.”). ↑

  23. See Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1979) (“even if the terms of the Convention were applicable, the Convention was not intended to abrogate the methods of service prescribed by F.R.C.P. Rule 4.”); AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG., 780 F.3d 420, 429 (1st Cir. 2015) (“By its plain terms, Rule 4(f)(3) does not require exhaustion of all possible methods of service before a court may authorize service by ‘other means,’ such as service through counsel and by email”); Viahart, L.L.C., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3974, at *8-9 (“Service pursuant to the Hague Convention listed in subsection (f)(1), does not displace subsection (f)(3), which permits service by other means.”); Nuance Commc ‘ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-19; Enovative Techs., LLC v. Leor, 622 F. App’x 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2015). ↑

  24. Compañía De Inversiones Mercantiles, S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., 970 F.3d 1269, 1294 (10th Cir. 2020). ↑

  25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). ↑

  26. River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 651 (7th Cir. 2011). ↑

  27. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 Amendment to Rule 4; see also Lonati v. Soxnet, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263356, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2021) (“Article 15 of the Hague Convention provides that ‘the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures. ’ And ‘[s]uch measures have been interpreted to include ‘special forms of service.’”). ↑

  28. Strabala, 318 F.R.D. at 114; 4B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1134 (4th Ed.) ↑

  29. Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1965 Service Convention (2025), ¶ 103. ↑

  30. See, e.g., Luxottica USA LLC v. The P’ships, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78961 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015); H-D U.S.A., LLC v. Guangzhou Tomas Crafts Co., et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2017); NBA Props., Inc., et al. v. Yan Zhou, et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148971 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2017); River Light V, L.P. and Tory Burch LLC v. Zhangyali, et al., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111301 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2016); Bulgari, S.p.A. v. Zou Xiaohong, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140606, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2015). ↑

  31. See Bulgari, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140606, at *6 (“This Court is not persuaded otherwise by Li’s unsubstantiated statement that ‘growing up in remote farmland, I was not familiar with European luxury products or brand names, including BVLGARI.’”); see also Monster Energy Co. v. Wensheng, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206592, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2016) (“The court is not persuaded otherwise by defendants’ unsubstantiated assertions that these ‘are the actions of an un-informed Chinese citizen that made a mistake.’”). ↑

  32. See, e.g., Decl. of Justin R. Gaudio at ¶ 12-14, and Exhibits 8-9, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-09401 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2024) (No. 25). ↑

  33. See, e.g., SellerDefense, https://sellerdefense.cn/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); What Should I Do If I Place an Order with the Buyer’s Address of GBC Law Firm?, Zhihu, https://www.zhihu.com/question/479354989/answer/1897620658780865662 (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); 61TRO, https://61tro.com/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); Be Careful! Unfortunately, It Encountered the Phishing Law Enforcement of the US GBC, and suffered Heavy Losses!, b2b3 (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.b2b3.com/forumArticle/detail/1043; Amz50, https://www.amz520.com/amzsource/152.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); Platform Product Warning, Szzhuoju, https://szzhuoju.com/qisuhejie/pingtaichanpinyujing150 (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); Independent Station’s Hottop, Summary of Phishing Evidence Collection Addresses of US Law Firms, Chwang (Aug. 27, 2024), https://www.chwang.com/article/182827815807; Zou Yang’s FBM Notes, Amazon Sellers’ Nightmare: What to Do About GBC Infringement Enforcement, Baidu (Nov. 18, 2023), https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1782875185743314640&wfr=spider&for=pc; cdAmazon, GBC Anti-Phishing Strategy, the Most Important Thing is to Conduct a Professional Infringement Check Before Listing!, Zhihu (May 10, 2023), https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/628545564; Mai Xiaotian on Infringement, (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.cifnews.com/article/102399. ↑

  34. Jeffrey M. Allen & Ashley Hallene, Document Automation, Am. Bar. Ass’n (Jan. 25, 2024), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/resources/ereport/2024-january/document-automation/; see also Document Automation: The Easiest Way to Save Up to 82% of Your Time, Thomson Reuters, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/document-automation-saves-time (last visited Sept. 23, 2025). ↑

  35. The complexity of the case determines what level of detail may be needed. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010) (“in many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a plaintiff to meet that burden [of stating a claim] than it was before the Court’s recent [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8] decisions.”). Trademark and copyright cases are not subject to any heightened pleading standards. See Mid America Title Company v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1993) (Rule 8 applies in copyright infringement cases); Lane Bryant, Inc., v. Maternity Lane, Limited, of Cal., 173 F.2d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1949) (Rule 8 applies in trademark infringement cases). ↑

  36. Under Rule 8, “the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); see also Bautista v. L.A. Cty., 216 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2000) (“True, the complaint states the relevant facts at a high level of generality. But that is the point of notice pleading: a plaintiff need only provide the bare outlines of his claim.”). ↑

  37. “Particularity is required only for those actions involving averments of fraud or mistake, as listed under Rule 9(b).” Bautista, 216 F.3d at 842. ↑

  38. See Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581; see also Wang v. P’ships, et al., 2022 WL 2463043, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2022) (“As a threshold point, referring to defendants collectively is appropriate when the plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in the same conduct”) (citing Brooks, 578 F.3d at 582); Foxmind Canada Enters., Ltd. v. Individuals, et al., 2022 WL 17251329, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2022) (“The fact that plaintiff makes the same factual allegations for each defendant does not mean that these allegations are conclusory[.]”); Fulton v. Bartik, 547 F. Supp. 3d 799, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Additionally, a “complaint need not include facts alleging personal jurisdiction.” Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Rule 8’s requirement that a complaint state the “grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” refers to subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. See Stirling Homex Corp. v. Homasote Co., 437 F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1971). ↑

  39. See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1988) (“the district court is entitled to consider exhibits attached to the complaint as part of the pleadings.”). See Patagonia, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc., 2023 WL 6852028, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2023) (“Plaintiff includes a chart of all the trademarks Plaintiff owns and has been infringed upon by the Defendants’ conduct. It takes little effort to compare the designs on the infringing articles to match with the Marks Plaintiff owns, leaving little room for confusion. Accordingly, no further clarification is needed.”); see also Pit Viper, 2024 WL 5039888, at *5. ↑

  40. Order, Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation v. The Individuals, et al., No. 24-cv-12487 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2025) (No. 156) (“That is all the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard requires.”). ↑

  41. Bautista, 216 F.3d at 843-44 (Plaintiffs who base their claims on a common legal theory and set of facts are entitled to consolidate their claims in a single count of the complaint. Indeed, the separate statement of seventy-three almost identical counts in this case would only waste paper and increase confusion, not promote the principal objective of pleading under the Federal Rules: ‘to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.’”) (citation omitted). ↑

  42. To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, a party does not need to prove it will definitely win on the merits. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020). Instead, the moving party just needs to make a strong showing on the merits. Id. This does not mean proof by a preponderance of the evidence; it simply means there must be a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its case. Id. The screenshot evidence, the intellectual property registration certificates, and provided facts and analysis make this showing. Plaintiffs are typically required to post a bond in the event of a wrongful restraint, which balances the competing interests of defendants. ↑

  43. Schedule A cases are intended only for rights owners with legitimate IP rights that are not susceptible to validity challenges, and cases of straightforward and obvious trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases, and/or copyright infringement. See Best Practices, Safe Bar Ass’n, https://safeip.org/best-practices/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2025). With the exception of a limited number of design patent cases, cases outside of this scope should not be brought as Schedule A cases. Judges regularly recognize the distinction and perform their gate-keeping function. Additionally, Defendants virtually never challenge the merits when they appear; rather they focus on procedural challenges which indicates that the merits are strong in these cases. ↑

  44. See, e.g., http://gbcinternetenforcement.net/files/caseNo-25-cv-21754/THOMAS-DEC1.pdf; http://gbcinternetenforcement.net/files/caseNo-25-cv-20413/EX2-DEC1.pdf. ↑

  45. In copyright cases, “copying may be inferred ‘where the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and the accused work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work.’” JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “It is not essential to prove access, however. If the ‘two works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one is a copy of the earlier one, the issue of access need not be addressed separately, since if the later work was a copy its creator must have had access to the original.’” Id. (citation omitted). ↑

  46. In trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases, a likelihood of confusion can be presumed when the mark is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s mark. See H-D U.S.A., LLC v. SunFrog, LLC, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1032 (E.D. Wis. 2018). And even without the presumption, the defendants included all fit a fact pattern where the likelihood of confusion factors will favor the rights owners, so the only factor the court needs to evaluate is similarity. The screenshot evidence identifies the relevant trademark, shows how that defendants are using the trademark, and how defendants are marketing and selling the product. See Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 140 F.4th at 1327 (“[I]nfringement under § 1114(1) merely requires a use ‘in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distributing, or advertising of any goods.’”). ↑

  47. Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000). ↑

  48. See McGilvray v. Powell 700 N., 186 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1951); Lansburgh & Bro. v. Clark, 127 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see also Coach, Inc. v. 1941 Coachoutletstore.com, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311, at *12-14 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only apply to the extent that they ‘affect any party’s substantial rights.’”). ↑

  49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 282 F.R.D. 161, 166 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“Rule 20 should be viewed in light of the overarching policy of Rule 1[.]”). See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”). “As noted by Professor Wright … : ‘[C]ourts do not exist to formulate concepts; they exist, rather, to adjudicate controversies …. Any device which will reduce the volume of litigation and end the necessity for litigating the same issues over and over in different lawsuits is highly desirable.” Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1723, 1728 (1998) (citing Charles Alan Wright, Modern Pleading and the Alabama Rules, 9 Ala. L. Rev. 179, 196-97 (1957)). ↑

  50. See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1495 (2020) (“Nor does this Court usually read into statutes words that aren’t there.”); see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.”). ↑

  51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B); see Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (“‘Transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.”); see also Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (“Accordingly, all ‘logically related’ events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence …. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.”). In Mosley, the Eighth Circuit also explained that what constitutes a single—as opposed to a series—of transactions of occurrences is determined on a case by case basis. Id. ↑

  52. “Without an objective basis to identify ‘transactions or occurrences,’ the proper analysis is an investigation of the fairest and most efficient way for a plaintiff to seek relief for the harm they have alleged.” Bose Corp. v. The P’ships, et al., 334 F.R.D. 511, 514 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Additionally, many of the rationales that apply to Rule 23 “appl[y] with equal force” to Rule 20. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1952). ↑

  53. A “series” means “a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial or temporal succession.” Series, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/series (last visited Sept. 23, 2025). Dean v. City of Chicago, 2009 WL 2848865, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2009) (“[A] ‘series of transactions or occurrences,’ [is] a separate basis permitting joinder under Rule 20 …. [A] court’s determination … that denial of joinder was not an abuse of discretion does not mean that denial of joinder was the only correct choice.”). ↑

  54. See, e.g., Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 513-17 (“But Rule 20 joinder can be based not just on ‘transactions,’ but also on ‘occurrences.’ Of course, Rule 20 does not define ‘occurrence’ any more than it defines ‘transaction.’ And it appears that no court has considered the meaning of ‘occurrence’ apart from the meaning of ‘transaction,’ even though ‘[c]anons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive’—as are ‘transactions or occurrences’ in Rule 20—’be given separate meanings.’”) (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229 (1993)); Neman Bros. & Assocs., Inc. v. P’ships, et al., 2024 WL 5056449, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2024); BTL Indus., Inc. v. Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified in Schedule A, 2024 WL 5361759, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2024); Order, Zou v. The Entities, et al., No. 23-cv-16600 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2024) (No. 60); Order, Merch Traffic, LLC v. The P’ships, et al., No. 25-cv-01180 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2025) (No. 36); Order, Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation v. The Individuals, et al., No. 24-cv-12487 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2025) (No. 156); Viahart, 2022 WL 445161, at *4. ↑

  55. Order, Merch Traffic, LLC v. The P’ships, et al., No. 25-cv-01180 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2025) (No. 36). See Neman Bros., 2024 WL 5056449, at *4 (“[Defendant] also does not point to any prejudice or expense it will incur if joinder is permitted, nor does the Court see any.”); see also Moore v. Comfed Sav. Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1990) (“No court would want to have 644 separate lawsuits.”). ↑

  56. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cosms. Ltd. v. P’ships, et al., 334 F.R.D. 182, 186 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Among other flaws with Estee Lauder, it relies on George v. Smith to justify sua sponte joinder screening and referencing filing fees. Id. (citing 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)). However, George is a prisoner’s case—its rationale only applies to cases brought under the PRLA for the specific reasons it was enacted. See Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2011). ↑

  57. Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 326 F.R.D. 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he government’s concern that, without severance, the ‘U.S. court system’ will be ‘deprived … of thousands of dollars in filing fees,’ …, is simply not the measure of whether severance is warranted, however …. Far from ‘judicious,’ … this result would run afoul of this important statute’s history, text, and purpose.”); Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 517 n. 6 (“But the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not to generate income for the court. Requiring the filing of separate complaints could flood the courts with thousands of additional single defendant Lanham Act cases, with no difference in resolution of nearly every case in a practical sense. The only thing that will inevitably occur is the slowdown of adjudications of other lawsuits, or the decrease of filings of cases which on their face have alleged plausible violations of the Lanham Act.”). ↑

  58. Greg Reilly, Aggregating Defendants, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1011, 1051 (2014) (“A judge may resist aggregating defendants, not because it is against defendants’ interests, but because it is against the judge’s own self-interest. In granting de-aggregation, judges sometimes cite self-interested justifications that are weak from a disinterested perspective, such as the plaintiff’s circumvention of filing fees or the single credit the judge gets for purposes of caseload distribution.”). ↑

  59. For example, in 2012, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, among other things, limited joinder of defendants in patent infringement cases to those “offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product or process.” See 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1). If Congress intended to prohibit brand owners from bringing trademark infringement actions against logically connected groups of defendants, it would have done so. See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1495 (2020) (“Nor does this Court usually read into statutes words that aren’t there.”). ↑

  60. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-09401 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2024) (No. 27). ↑

  61. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965); Patrick Collins, Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 166, 168 (“Applying this liberal construction standard in [Mississippi], the Supreme Court found that allegations of a state-wide system designed to enforce the voter registration laws in a way that would inevitably deprive African-Americans of the right to vote solely because of their color, justified the joinder of registrars of six counties as defendants. The Supreme Court reversed a district court’s decision which held that, “the complaint improperly attempted to hold the six county registrars jointly liable for what amounted to nothing more than individual torts committed by them separately with reference to separate applicants.” Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 142. Although the district court’s decision amounted to a finding of a lack of concerted action by the six registrars—who were from different geographical areas, acted independently of each other, and perhaps had never met one another—the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 20 to encompass a right to relief severally so long as transactional relatedness and commonality in fact or law are met.”). ↑

  62. Johnson v. High Desert State Prison, 127 F.4th 123, 134-37 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he court here abused its discretion when basing its decision on hypothetical concerns that were without support in the record …. [T]he court’s ‘practical considerations’ concern was ‘at most, abstract observations, amounting only to speculation” …. Even if, in the district court’s experience, actions like this one face ‘delay and confusion,’ the Federal Rules still require that the court tether its reasoning to facts in the particular case …. [T]hese hypothetical concerns were not actually reflected in the record before the district court. And, if these hypotheticals ever came to fruition, the district court can then sever Plaintiffs from the lawsuit.”). ↑

  63. Venue is proper in any district for defendants located outside of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3); Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1972) (“Section 1391(d) reflects[] the longstanding rule that suits against alien defendants are outside those [general and specific venue] statutes.”) see also In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding, 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 did not displace “the [Brunette] rule, ‘which has prevailed throughout the history of the federal courts, [and] controls this case.’”); Peanuts Worldwide LLC v. P’ships, et al., 347 F.R.D. 316, 326 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“Defendant’s challenge to venue is a nonstarter: as a nonresident of the United States, it has no rights under the venue laws.”). ↑

  64. 28 U.S.C § 1651. ↑

  65. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1977). ↑

  66. Id. at 174; see also United States v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 815-16 (7th Cir. 1976); Chanel, Inc. v. 21948352, 769 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2025). ↑

  67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). ↑

  68. See Hearing Transcript at 22:3-16, Kawada Co. v. The Partnerships, et al., No. 19-cv-06838 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 70) (Lee, J.); see also Order, KTM AG v. The Individuals, et al., No. 21-cv-01380 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2022) (No. 74). There is also no statutory requirement that the third parties must receive notice and an opportunity to object before the Court names them in an injunction. See H-D Michigan, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops S.A., 694 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Should any non-party believe that it has been enjoined improperly, it is free to seek a modification or clarification from the district court.”); TV Tokyo Corp. v. Individuals, et al., 2025 WL 860188, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2025) (“Rather, Shopify is a nonparty that TV Tokyo contends is bound by the preliminary injunction because it has notice of the TRO and has acted and is acting in concert with the defendants who operate on its platform. In this situation, TV Tokyo must show the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2) are met even if it could have named Shopify as a party in the first instance.”). See also In re Teknek, LLC, 512 F.3d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Each adversary proceeding operates with its own list of parties; persons who must be notified in an adversary proceeding do not receive notice of events in the core proceeding, and the reverse.”). The plain text of Rule 65 provides that “the court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). There is also no authority including non-parties (i.e., agents) as adverse parties within the meaning of Rule 65, particularly when none of their substantive rights are at issue. In practice, third parties only need to be provided notice in the event that a plaintiff seeks to enforce the injunction against the third party through contempt proceedings. If third parties felt they were not bound by the injunctions, they would simply not comply. ↑

  69. See Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 131 (“[T]he common law action of ‘account’ is one of the earliest examples of a restitutionary action in equity, imposing on a defendant the obligation to disclose and return profits from the use of the plaintiff’s property.”); see also Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 293 F.2d 88, 95 (7th Cir. 1961) (“An accounting for an infringer’s profits is an equitable remedy.”); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(1), at 588 (2d ed.1993) (“Unlike the [constructive] trust, however, accounting does not seek any particular res or fund of money; the defendant will be forced to yield up profits, but the defendant can pay from any monies he might have, not some special account.”). “The trial court’s primary function is to make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party.” Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985). An award of profits serves as an important deterrent. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he smaller the violator, the less likely he is to be caught, and the more needful therefore is a heavy punishment if he is caught.”). ↑

  70. Johnson & Johnson v. Advanced Inventory Mgmt., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248831, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2020) (citations omitted). ↑

  71. See Cisco Sys. v. Shenzhen Usource Tech. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158008, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020). ↑

  72. Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 516. ↑

  73. Kay v. Individual, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117379, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2023) (“Considering the inherently deceptive nature of the counterfeiting business, and the likelihood that the Defendants have violated federal trademark laws, it is reasonable to presume Defendants will hide or transfer their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of this Court unless those assets are restrained.”). ↑

  74. See, e.g., Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. P’ships, et al., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205985, at *7; Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Jasso, 927 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1996) (“[P]roceedings against those who deliberately traffic in infringing merchandise are often rendered useless if notice is given before temporary injunctive and impoundment relief can be granted.”). ↑

  75. Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 131; Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc., 256 Fed. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (ruling that the district court was “authorized to preserve the status quo by entering a limited asset freeze” in a Lanham Act infringement case); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the “district court had the authority to freeze those assets which could have been used to satisfy an equitable award of profits” in a Lanham Act case); Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 562 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The district court’s inherent equitable power to freeze defendants’ assets in cases in which an accounting is the ultimate relief sought is therefore not limited by the Lanham Act.”); see also CSC Holdings, 309 F.3d at 996 (noting that because plaintiff sought an “accounting and profits remedy” as an alternative form of relief under the Cable Communications Policy Act, an “asset freeze [was] thus proper” under Grupo Mexicano). ↑

  76. Matter of Vuitton, 606 F.2d at 5. ↑

  77. See supra note 11. ↑

  78. Zorro Prods., Inc. v. Individuals, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226550, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2023). Notably, the same judge was also recently reversed by the Seventh Circuit for abusing its discretion by refusing to award profits in a Schedule A case. See Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store, 132 F.4th 526 (7th Cir. 2025). Among other issues, the Zorro Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to temporarily seal certain documents by erroneously relying on authority that was in the context of permanently sealed documents—not documents that would be temporarily sealed until a TRO was effectuated. See 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226550, at *3-4. ↑

  79. CSC Holdings, 309 F.3d at 996. ↑

  80. Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 133 (rejecting illusory accounting of profits request argument); see also Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 681 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A court abuses its discretion when ‘(1) the record contains no evidence upon which the court could have rationally based its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.’”); Johnson v. High Desert State Prison, 127 F.4th 123, 134-37 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he court here abused its discretion when basing its decision on hypothetical concerns that were without support in the record.”). ↑

  81. The Eicher Motors Ltd. v. The Individuals, et al., opinion is also based almost exclusively on this faulty “scholarship.” The same Court also previously acknowledged that it would be inappropriate to base its decisions based on these articles. See Order, Fletcher. et al v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-00717 (N.D. Ill. Aug 7, 2024) (No. 40) (Kness, J.). See also United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020) (“’[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government.’ …They ‘do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. [They] wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, courts] normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’”). ↑

  82. Victoria Arnold-Rees, “One of the Few Effective Mechanisms”: Academic Paper Was Wrong to Target Multi-seller Litigation Actions, World Trademark Rev. (Apr. 1, 2023), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/one-of-the-feweffective-mechanisms-academic-paper-was-wrong-target-multi-sellerlitigation-actions [https://perma.cc/XW5J-UAKV]. ↑

  83. Kari Kammel & Jessica Boeve, Beyond the Brick-and-Mortar Paradigm: The Legal and Procedural Foundations of Schedule A Litigation in Combating Online Counterfeiting as Distinct from Traditional Trademark Enforcement (2025), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5508098; see also Elizabeth Banegas, Schedule “A” Cases. Not Sad at All, 65 Idea: L. Rev. Franklin Pierce Ctr. for Intell. Prop. 107 (2024) ↑

Unpublished Decisions