SAFE Releases Best Practices for Schedule A Litigation

NBA Props., Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 627 (7th Cir. 2022). ↑

Am. Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271, 280 (2d Cir. 2024). ↑

Viahart, L.L.C. v. GangPeng, 2022 WL 445161, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022). ↑

Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store, 132 F.4th 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2025); Dolls Kill, Inc. v. MengEryt, No. 24-2841, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28582, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) ↑

Cosrx Inc. v. FDPR Home Harmony, No. 25-3038, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 2656, at *1-2 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026). This decision will also help counter the growing trend of AI-generated pro se filings that are clogging up district court dockets in Schedule A cases. ↑

ABC Corp. I v. P’ship & Unincorporated Ass’ns. Identified on Schedule “A”, 52 F.4th 934, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2022); ABC Corp. I v. P’ship & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20651, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 2025). ↑

See, e.g., Nagravision SA v. Gotech Int’l Tech. Ltd., 882 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2018); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2002); Viahart, 2022 WL 445161, at *3. ↑

See, e.g., World Wrestling Ent., Inc. v. Unidentified Parties, 770 F.3d 1143, 1144-46 (5th Cir. 2014); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1980). ↑

Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Suing a code name is in principle no different from suing any other name, which must be linked to a particular person by the time of judgment. In principle a person could be sued by Social Security number, passport number, or any other identifier. For some purposes the code is better; the world has a lot of people named ‘John Smith’ (and even some named ‘John Q. Public’), while a unique identifier is specific.”). ↑

See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir. 2009). ↑

See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2014); Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc., 256 F. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2007); Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d at 561 (9th Cir. 1992). The Gucci Am. Court also rejected the argument that the asset restraint “exceeded the court’s equitable authority because it failed to identify the ‘particular property’ derived from the defendants’ allegedly unlawful activities that the plaintiffs seek to recover” and that the plaintiffs’ request for an accounting was illusory. Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 133; see also CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Redisi, 309 F.3d 988, 996 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming, asset freeze proper for the pendency of a case where plaintiff seeks an accounting of profits and in the alternative, statutory damages). ↑

Matter of Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 4-5 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 325 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The requirements of Rule 65(b) need not be burdensome when there is truly a need to proceed ex parte.”). ↑

See, e.g., Matter of Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d at 2, 5; First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 651 (6th Cir. 1993); Reno Air Racing Ass’n., Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). ↑

See, e.g., Zembrka, 118 F.4th at 277-78; NBA Props., 46 F.4th at 624-25; Manchester United Football Club Ltd. v. P’ships, et al., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231758, at *9-12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2024); Pit Viper, LLC v. Xi’An Jiaye Tengda Trading Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222165, at *6-11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2024). ↑

See, e.g., ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais, LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2001); Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. Polygroup MacAu Ltd., 140 F.4th 1304, 1315-25 (11th Cir. 2025); Nagravision, 882 F.3d at 489-99; United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 1999). District Courts also have an independent obligation to consider whether to transfer a case if jurisdiction is lacking. North v. Ubiquity, Inc., 72 F.4th 221, 228 (7th Cir. 2023). ↑

See, e.g., Peanuts Worldwide LLC v. P’ships, et al., 347 F.R.D. 316, 330 (N.D. Ill. 2024); NBA Properties, Inc. v. P’ships, et al., 549 F. Supp. 3d 790, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2021); Strabala v. Zhang, 318 F.R.D. 81, 114-15 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Individuals, et al., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216016, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2025); Chen v. P’ships, et al., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3672, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2025); Oakley, Inc. v. Yantai Lanlei Network Tech. Co., Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 273527, at *3, *4 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2021); Neman Bros. & Assocs. v. P’ships, et al., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223383, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2024); Order, Skechers U.S.A., Inc. II, v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-07333 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2025) (No. 120).. ↑

Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); see also NBA Props, 549 F. Supp. 3d at 796; Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Tech. Co. v. P’ships, et al., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64064, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2021) (“the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not require Plaintiffs to attempt Hague Convention service prior to seeking alternative service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3)”).. ↑

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3); see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015. ↑

See, e.g., Peanuts Worldwide, 347 F.R.D. at 324-25. ↑

Id. at 324-31. ↑

No. 24-313, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33039 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2025). ↑

Id. at *11, 20 (“we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying relief here.”). ↑

See Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1979) (“even if the terms of the Convention were applicable, the Convention was not intended to abrogate the methods of service prescribed by F.R.C.P. Rule 4.”); AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG., 780 F.3d 420, 429 (1st Cir. 2015) (“By its plain terms, Rule 4(f)(3) does not require exhaustion of all possible methods of service before a court may authorize service by ‘other means,’ such as service through counsel and by email”); Viahart, L.L.C., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3974, at *8-9 (“Service pursuant to the Hague Convention listed in subsection (f)(1), does not displace subsection (f)(3), which permits service by other means.”); Nuance Commc ‘ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-19; Enovative Techs., LLC v. Leor, 622 F. App’x 212, 214 (4th Cir. 2015). ↑

Compañía De Inversiones Mercantiles, S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de C.V., 970 F.3d 1269, 1294 (10th Cir. 2020). ↑

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). ↑

River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 651 (7th Cir. 2011). ↑

See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1993 Amendment to Rule 4; see also Lonati v. Soxnet, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263356, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2021) (“Article 15 of the Hague Convention provides that ‘the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures. ’ And ‘[s]uch measures have been interpreted to include ‘special forms of service.’”). ↑

Strabala, 318 F.R.D. at 114; 4B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1134 (4th Ed.) ↑

Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law, Practical Handbook on the Operation of the 1965 Service Convention (2025), ¶ 103. ↑

See, e.g., Luxottica USA LLC v. The P’ships, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78961 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2015); H-D U.S.A., LLC v. Guangzhou Tomas Crafts Co., et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2017); NBA Props., Inc., et al. v. Yan Zhou, et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148971 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2017); River Light V, L.P. and Tory Burch LLC v. Zhangyali, et al., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111301 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2016); Bulgari, S.p.A. v. Zou Xiaohong, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140606, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2015). ↑

See Bulgari, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140606, at *6 (“This Court is not persuaded otherwise by Li’s unsubstantiated statement that ‘growing up in remote farmland, I was not familiar with European luxury products or brand names, including BVLGARI.’”); see also Monster Energy Co. v. Wensheng, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206592, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2016) (“The court is not persuaded otherwise by defendants’ unsubstantiated assertions that these ‘are the actions of an un-informed Chinese citizen that made a mistake.’”). ↑

See, e.g., Decl. of Justin R. Gaudio at ¶ 12-14, and Exhibits 8-9, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-09401 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2024) (No. 25). ↑

See, e.g., SellerDefense, https://sellerdefense.cn/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); What Should I Do If I Place an Order with the Buyer’s Address of GBC Law Firm?, Zhihu, https://www.zhihu.com/question/479354989/answer/1897620658780865662 (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); 61TRO, https://61tro.com/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); Be Careful! Unfortunately, It Encountered the Phishing Law Enforcement of the US GBC, and suffered Heavy Losses!, b2b3 (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.b2b3.com/forumArticle/detail/1043; Amz50, https://www.amz520.com/amzsource/152.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); Platform Product Warning, Szzhuoju, https://szzhuoju.com/qisuhejie/pingtaichanpinyujing150 (last visited Sept. 23, 2025); Independent Station’s Hottop, Summary of Phishing Evidence Collection Addresses of US Law Firms, Chwang (Aug. 27, 2024), https://www.chwang.com/article/182827815807; Zou Yang’s FBM Notes, Amazon Sellers’ Nightmare: What to Do About GBC Infringement Enforcement, Baidu (Nov. 18, 2023), https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1782875185743314640&wfr=spider&for=pc; cdAmazon, GBC Anti-Phishing Strategy, the Most Important Thing is to Conduct a Professional Infringement Check Before Listing!, Zhihu (May 10, 2023), https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/628545564; Mai Xiaotian on Infringement, (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.cifnews.com/article/102399. ↑

Jeffrey M. Allen & Ashley Hallene, Document Automation, Am. Bar. Ass’n (Jan. 25, 2024), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/resources/ereport/2024-january/document-automation/; see also Document Automation: The Easiest Way to Save Up to 82% of Your Time, Thomson Reuters, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/document-automation-saves-time (last visited Sept. 23, 2025). ↑

The complexity of the case determines what level of detail may be needed. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010) (“in many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a plaintiff to meet that burden [of stating a claim] than it was before the Court’s recent [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8] decisions.”). Trademark and copyright cases are not subject to any heightened pleading standards. See Mid America Title Company v. Kirk, 991 F.2d 417, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1993) (Rule 8 applies in copyright infringement cases); Lane Bryant, Inc., v. Maternity Lane, Limited, of Cal., 173 F.2d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 1949) (Rule 8 applies in trademark infringement cases). ↑

Under Rule 8, “the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); see also Bautista v. L.A. Cty., 216 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2000) (“True, the complaint states the relevant facts at a high level of generality. But that is the point of notice pleading: a plaintiff need only provide the bare outlines of his claim.”). ↑

“Particularity is required only for those actions involving averments of fraud or mistake, as listed under Rule 9(b).” Bautista, 216 F.3d at 842. ↑

See Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581; see also Wang v. P’ships, et al., 2022 WL 2463043, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2022) (“As a threshold point, referring to defendants collectively is appropriate when the plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in the same conduct”) (citing Brooks, 578 F.3d at 582); Foxmind Canada Enters., Ltd. v. Individuals, et al., 2022 WL 17251329, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2022) (“The fact that plaintiff makes the same factual allegations for each defendant does not mean that these allegations are conclusory[.]”); Fulton v. Bartik, 547 F. Supp. 3d 799, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Additionally, a “complaint need not include facts alleging personal jurisdiction.” Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Rule 8’s requirement that a complaint state the “grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” refers to subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. See Stirling Homex Corp. v. Homasote Co., 437 F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1971). ↑

See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1988) (“the district court is entitled to consider exhibits attached to the complaint as part of the pleadings.”). See Patagonia, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc., 2023 WL 6852028, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2023) (“Plaintiff includes a chart of all the trademarks Plaintiff owns and has been infringed upon by the Defendants’ conduct. It takes little effort to compare the designs on the infringing articles to match with the Marks Plaintiff owns, leaving little room for confusion. Accordingly, no further clarification is needed.”); see also Pit Viper, 2024 WL 5039888, at *5. ↑

Order, Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation v. The Individuals, et al., No. 24-cv-12487 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2025) (No. 156) (“That is all the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard requires.”). ↑

Bautista, 216 F.3d at 843-44 (Plaintiffs who base their claims on a common legal theory and set of facts are entitled to consolidate their claims in a single count of the complaint. Indeed, the separate statement of seventy-three almost identical counts in this case would only waste paper and increase confusion, not promote the principal objective of pleading under the Federal Rules: ‘to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.’”) (citation omitted). ↑

To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, a party does not need to prove it will definitely win on the merits. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020). Instead, the moving party just needs to make a strong showing on the merits. Id. This does not mean proof by a preponderance of the evidence; it simply means there must be a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its case. Id. The screenshot evidence, the intellectual property registration certificates, and provided facts and analysis make this showing. Plaintiffs are typically required to post a bond in the event of a wrongful restraint, which balances the competing interests of defendants. ↑

Schedule A cases are intended only for rights owners with legitimate IP rights that are not susceptible to validity challenges, and cases of straightforward and obvious trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases, and/or copyright infringement. See Best Practices, Safe Bar Ass’n, https://safeip.org/best-practices/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2025). With the exception of a limited number of design patent cases, cases outside of this scope should not be brought as Schedule A cases. Judges regularly recognize the distinction and perform their gate-keeping function. Additionally, Defendants virtually never challenge the merits when they appear; rather they focus on procedural challenges which indicates that the merits are strong in these cases. ↑

See, e.g., http://gbcinternetenforcement.net/files/caseNo-25-cv-21754/THOMAS-DEC1.pdf; http://gbcinternetenforcement.net/files/caseNo-25-cv-20413/EX2-DEC1.pdf. ↑

In copyright cases, “copying may be inferred ‘where the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and the accused work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work.’” JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “It is not essential to prove access, however. If the ‘two works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one is a copy of the earlier one, the issue of access need not be addressed separately, since if the later work was a copy its creator must have had access to the original.’” Id. (citation omitted). ↑

In trademark infringement and counterfeiting cases, a likelihood of confusion can be presumed when the mark is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s mark. See H-D U.S.A., LLC v. SunFrog, LLC, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1032 (E.D. Wis. 2018). And even without the presumption, the defendants included all fit a fact pattern where the likelihood of confusion factors will favor the rights owners, so the only factor the court needs to evaluate is similarity. The screenshot evidence identifies the relevant trademark, shows how that defendants are using the trademark, and how defendants are marketing and selling the product. See Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 140 F.4th at 1327 (“[I]nfringement under § 1114(1) merely requires a use ‘in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distributing, or advertising of any goods.’”). ↑

Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000). ↑

See McGilvray v. Powell 700 N., 186 F.2d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 1951); Lansburgh & Bro. v. Clark, 127 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see also Coach, Inc. v. 1941 Coachoutletstore.com, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1311, at *12-14 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only apply to the extent that they ‘affect any party’s substantial rights.’”). ↑

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 282 F.R.D. 161, 166 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“Rule 20 should be viewed in light of the overarching policy of Rule 1[.]”). See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”). “As noted by Professor Wright … : ‘[C]ourts do not exist to formulate concepts; they exist, rather, to adjudicate controversies …. Any device which will reduce the volume of litigation and end the necessity for litigating the same issues over and over in different lawsuits is highly desirable.” Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1723, 1728 (1998) (citing Charles Alan Wright, Modern Pleading and the Alabama Rules, 9 Ala. L. Rev. 179, 196-97 (1957)). ↑

See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1495 (2020) (“Nor does this Court usually read into statutes words that aren’t there.”); see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.”). ↑

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B); see Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (“‘Transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship.”); see also Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (“Accordingly, all ‘logically related’ events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence …. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.”). In Mosley, the Eighth Circuit also explained that what constitutes a single—as opposed to a series—of transactions of occurrences is determined on a case by case basis. Id. ↑

“Without an objective basis to identify ‘transactions or occurrences,’ the proper analysis is an investigation of the fairest and most efficient way for a plaintiff to seek relief for the harm they have alleged.” Bose Corp. v. The P’ships, et al., 334 F.R.D. 511, 514 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Additionally, many of the rationales that apply to Rule 23 “appl[y] with equal force” to Rule 20. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1952). ↑

A “series” means “a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial or temporal succession.” Series, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/series (last visited Sept. 23, 2025). Dean v. City of Chicago, 2009 WL 2848865, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2009) (“[A] ‘series of transactions or occurrences,’ [is] a separate basis permitting joinder under Rule 20 …. [A] court’s determination … that denial of joinder was not an abuse of discretion does not mean that denial of joinder was the only correct choice.”). ↑

See, e.g., Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 513-17 (“But Rule 20 joinder can be based not just on ‘transactions,’ but also on ‘occurrences.’ Of course, Rule 20 does not define ‘occurrence’ any more than it defines ‘transaction.’ And it appears that no court has considered the meaning of ‘occurrence’ apart from the meaning of ‘transaction,’ even though ‘[c]anons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive’—as are ‘transactions or occurrences’ in Rule 20—’be given separate meanings.’”) (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229 (1993)); Neman Bros. & Assocs., Inc. v. P’ships, et al., 2024 WL 5056449, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2024); BTL Indus., Inc. v. Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified in Schedule A, 2024 WL 5361759, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2024); Order, Zou v. The Entities, et al., No. 23-cv-16600 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2024) (No. 60); Order, Merch Traffic, LLC v. The P’ships, et al., No. 25-cv-01180 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2025) (No. 36); Order, Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation v. The Individuals, et al., No. 24-cv-12487 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2025) (No. 156); Viahart, 2022 WL 445161, at *4. ↑

Order, Merch Traffic, LLC v. The P’ships, et al., No. 25-cv-01180 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2025) (No. 36). See Neman Bros., 2024 WL 5056449, at *4 (“[Defendant] also does not point to any prejudice or expense it will incur if joinder is permitted, nor does the Court see any.”); see also Moore v. Comfed Sav. Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1990) (“No court would want to have 644 separate lawsuits.”). ↑

See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cosms. Ltd. v. P’ships, et al., 334 F.R.D. 182, 186 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Among other flaws with Estee Lauder, it relies on George v. Smith to justify sua sponte joinder screening and referencing filing fees. Id. (citing 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)). However, George is a prisoner’s case—its rationale only applies to cases brought under the PRLA for the specific reasons it was enacted. See Dorsey v. Varga, 55 F.4th 1094, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2011). ↑

Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 326 F.R.D. 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he government’s concern that, without severance, the ‘U.S. court system’ will be ‘deprived … of thousands of dollars in filing fees,’ …, is simply not the measure of whether severance is warranted, however …. Far from ‘judicious,’ … this result would run afoul of this important statute’s history, text, and purpose.”); Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 517 n. 6 (“But the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not to generate income for the court. Requiring the filing of separate complaints could flood the courts with thousands of additional single defendant Lanham Act cases, with no difference in resolution of nearly every case in a practical sense. The only thing that will inevitably occur is the slowdown of adjudications of other lawsuits, or the decrease of filings of cases which on their face have alleged plausible violations of the Lanham Act.”). ↑

Greg Reilly, Aggregating Defendants, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1011, 1051 (2014) (“A judge may resist aggregating defendants, not because it is against defendants’ interests, but because it is against the judge’s own self-interest. In granting de-aggregation, judges sometimes cite self-interested justifications that are weak from a disinterested perspective, such as the plaintiff’s circumvention of filing fees or the single credit the judge gets for purposes of caseload distribution.”). ↑

For example, in 2012, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, among other things, limited joinder of defendants in patent infringement cases to those “offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product or process.” See 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1). If Congress intended to prohibit brand owners from bringing trademark infringement actions against logically connected groups of defendants, it would have done so. See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1495 (2020) (“Nor does this Court usually read into statutes words that aren’t there.”). ↑

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-09401 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2024) (No. 27). ↑

United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965); Patrick Collins, Inc., 282 F.R.D. at 166, 168 (“Applying this liberal construction standard in [Mississippi], the Supreme Court found that allegations of a state-wide system designed to enforce the voter registration laws in a way that would inevitably deprive African-Americans of the right to vote solely because of their color, justified the joinder of registrars of six counties as defendants. The Supreme Court reversed a district court’s decision which held that, “the complaint improperly attempted to hold the six county registrars jointly liable for what amounted to nothing more than individual torts committed by them separately with reference to separate applicants.” Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 142. Although the district court’s decision amounted to a finding of a lack of concerted action by the six registrars—who were from different geographical areas, acted independently of each other, and perhaps had never met one another—the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 20 to encompass a right to relief severally so long as transactional relatedness and commonality in fact or law are met.”). ↑

Johnson v. High Desert State Prison, 127 F.4th 123, 134-37 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he court here abused its discretion when basing its decision on hypothetical concerns that were without support in the record …. [T]he court’s ‘practical considerations’ concern was ‘at most, abstract observations, amounting only to speculation” …. Even if, in the district court’s experience, actions like this one face ‘delay and confusion,’ the Federal Rules still require that the court tether its reasoning to facts in the particular case …. [T]hese hypothetical concerns were not actually reflected in the record before the district court. And, if these hypotheticals ever came to fruition, the district court can then sever Plaintiffs from the lawsuit.”). ↑

Venue is proper in any district for defendants located outside of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3); Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1972) (“Section 1391(d) reflects[] the longstanding rule that suits against alien defendants are outside those [general and specific venue] statutes.”) see also In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding, 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 did not displace “the [Brunette] rule, ‘which has prevailed throughout the history of the federal courts, [and] controls this case.’”); Peanuts Worldwide LLC v. P’ships, et al., 347 F.R.D. 316, 326 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“Defendant’s challenge to venue is a nonstarter: as a nonresident of the United States, it has no rights under the venue laws.”). ↑

28 U.S.C § 1651. ↑

See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1977). ↑

Id. at 174; see also United States v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 815-16 (7th Cir. 1976); Chanel, Inc. v. 21948352, 769 F. Supp. 3d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2025). ↑

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). ↑

See Hearing Transcript at 22:3-16, Kawada Co. v. The Partnerships, et al., No. 19-cv-06838 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2019) (No. 70) (Lee, J.); see also Order, KTM AG v. The Individuals, et al., No. 21-cv-01380 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2022) (No. 74). There is also no statutory requirement that the third parties must receive notice and an opportunity to object before the Court names them in an injunction. See H-D Michigan, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops S.A., 694 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Should any non-party believe that it has been enjoined improperly, it is free to seek a modification or clarification from the district court.”); TV Tokyo Corp. v. Individuals, et al., 2025 WL 860188, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2025) (“Rather, Shopify is a nonparty that TV Tokyo contends is bound by the preliminary injunction because it has notice of the TRO and has acted and is acting in concert with the defendants who operate on its platform. In this situation, TV Tokyo must show the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2) are met even if it could have named Shopify as a party in the first instance.”). See also In re Teknek, LLC, 512 F.3d 342, 345 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Each adversary proceeding operates with its own list of parties; persons who must be notified in an adversary proceeding do not receive notice of events in the core proceeding, and the reverse.”). The plain text of Rule 65 provides that “the court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). There is also no authority including non-parties (i.e., agents) as adverse parties within the meaning of Rule 65, particularly when none of their substantive rights are at issue. In practice, third parties only need to be provided notice in the event that a plaintiff seeks to enforce the injunction against the third party through contempt proceedings. If third parties felt they were not bound by the injunctions, they would simply not comply. ↑

See Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 131 (“[T]he common law action of ‘account’ is one of the earliest examples of a restitutionary action in equity, imposing on a defendant the obligation to disclose and return profits from the use of the plaintiff’s property.”); see also Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 293 F.2d 88, 95 (7th Cir. 1961) (“An accounting for an infringer’s profits is an equitable remedy.”); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.3(1), at 588 (2d ed.1993) (“Unlike the [constructive] trust, however, accounting does not seek any particular res or fund of money; the defendant will be forced to yield up profits, but the defendant can pay from any monies he might have, not some special account.”). “The trial court’s primary function is to make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party.” Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985). An award of profits serves as an important deterrent. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he smaller the violator, the less likely he is to be caught, and the more needful therefore is a heavy punishment if he is caught.”). ↑

Johnson & Johnson v. Advanced Inventory Mgmt., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248831, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2020) (citations omitted). ↑

See Cisco Sys. v. Shenzhen Usource Tech. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158008, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020). ↑

Bose Corp., 334 F.R.D. at 516. ↑

Kay v. Individual, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117379, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2023) (“Considering the inherently deceptive nature of the counterfeiting business, and the likelihood that the Defendants have violated federal trademark laws, it is reasonable to presume Defendants will hide or transfer their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of this Court unless those assets are restrained.”). ↑

See, e.g., Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. P’ships, et al., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205985, at *7; Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Jasso, 927 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1996) (“[P]roceedings against those who deliberately traffic in infringing merchandise are often rendered useless if notice is given before temporary injunctive and impoundment relief can be granted.”). ↑

Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 131; Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny’s Perfume Inc., 256 Fed. App’x 707, 709 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (ruling that the district court was “authorized to preserve the status quo by entering a limited asset freeze” in a Lanham Act infringement case); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the “district court had the authority to freeze those assets which could have been used to satisfy an equitable award of profits” in a Lanham Act case); Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 562 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The district court’s inherent equitable power to freeze defendants’ assets in cases in which an accounting is the ultimate relief sought is therefore not limited by the Lanham Act.”); see also CSC Holdings, 309 F.3d at 996 (noting that because plaintiff sought an “accounting and profits remedy” as an alternative form of relief under the Cable Communications Policy Act, an “asset freeze [was] thus proper” under Grupo Mexicano). ↑

Matter of Vuitton, 606 F.2d at 5. ↑

See supra note 11. ↑

Zorro Prods., Inc. v. Individuals, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226550, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2023). Notably, the same judge was also recently reversed by the Seventh Circuit for abusing its discretion by refusing to award profits in a Schedule A case. See Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store, 132 F.4th 526 (7th Cir. 2025). Among other issues, the Zorro Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to temporarily seal certain documents by erroneously relying on authority that was in the context of permanently sealed documents—not documents that would be temporarily sealed until a TRO was effectuated. See 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226550, at *3-4. ↑

CSC Holdings, 309 F.3d at 996. ↑

Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 133 (rejecting illusory accounting of profits request argument); see also Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 681 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A court abuses its discretion when ‘(1) the record contains no evidence upon which the court could have rationally based its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.’”); Johnson v. High Desert State Prison, 127 F.4th 123, 134-37 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he court here abused its discretion when basing its decision on hypothetical concerns that were without support in the record.”). ↑

The Eicher Motors Ltd. v. The Individuals, et al., opinion is also based almost exclusively on this faulty “scholarship.” The same Court also previously acknowledged that it would be inappropriate to base its decisions based on these articles. See Order, Fletcher. et al v. The P’ships, et al., No. 24-cv-00717 (N.D. Ill. Aug 7, 2024) (No. 40) (Kness, J.). See also United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020) (“’[C]ourts are essentially passive instruments of government.’ …They ‘do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. [They] wait for cases to come to [them], and when [cases arise, courts] normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’”). ↑

Victoria Arnold-Rees, “One of the Few Effective Mechanisms”: Academic Paper Was Wrong to Target Multi-seller Litigation Actions, World Trademark Rev. (Apr. 1, 2023), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/article/one-of-the-feweffective-mechanisms-academic-paper-was-wrong-target-multi-sellerlitigation-actions [https://perma.cc/XW5J-UAKV]. ↑

Kari Kammel & Jessica Boeve, Beyond the Brick-and-Mortar Paradigm: The Legal and Procedural Foundations of Schedule A Litigation in Combating Online Counterfeiting as Distinct from Traditional Trademark Enforcement (2025), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5508098; see also Elizabeth Banegas, Schedule “A” Cases. Not Sad at All, 65 Idea: L. Rev. Franklin Pierce Ctr. for Intell. Prop. 107 (2024) ↑